Did the Buddhist clergy enjoy forms of religious immunity in premodern China? In addressing this broad question, allow me to start with a mildly facetious warning: let's not take any exemption for granted; or put another way, let us bracket our assumptions about who would grant exactly what, and to whom. We need, in fact, to pierce through a thick layer of hindsight wrapping all those things we want to know about in the past -state, church, religion, to name but few.
My remarks will be mostly confined to medieval China, though not even this plain compound should be seen as entirely uncontentious. Several Sinologists, Michael Nylan for example, have cautioned that any backward projection of ›China‹ may mislead us »to imagine the early dynasties on the model of the modern nation-state«, rather than the contested purview of courts and elites presiding over fluid processes of ethnic and political formation.
1 As for the ›medieval‹, its catches have been exposed long enough for us to sense the awkward in its application to Chinese history between two major imperial breakdowns, the Han 漢 in the third century and the Tang 唐 in the tenth. 2 These caveats, to be sure, are only there to whisper critical nuance, not certainly to trumpet from the outset a terminological fundamentalism that would soon leave us speechless, should we rashly stick to it. But at least they should suggest reasons why the words ›Late Antiquity‹ are in my title. This paradigm, by no means undisputed in itself, may well lend narrative coherence to a significant swathe of glob al history: I have started suggesting elsewhere, and will do at greater length in forthcoming work, that the centuries in which the Roman empire dissolves and Christianity rises have in teresting things to say when looked at from the perspective of the entire Old World oikou mene. The emergence, across boundaries, of communities defined by a new mode of dis course that we now identify as ›religion‹ is, in fact, a crucial marker of this period well beyond the Mediterranean, and most certainly in Buddhist Asia. 3 Conceiving this shift as a tale of churches and states, of religious groups vying with secular rulers, would probably miss much of the process that brought these entities to define and establish themselves against each other through the negotiated devolution of a common metapolitical order. 4 My global Late Antiquity starts therefore with the crisis and demise of the two great imperial formations at the opposite ends of the Old World, the Roman and the first Chinese empire, followed on both sides by political and social fragmentation and the simultaneous ascendancy, from the fourth century, of large social bodies centred on ›religion‹, what we call Christianity and Buddhism respectively. These remarkably similar trajectories, however, appear to have parted at the end of the sixth century. While the Chinese sphere then recovered a political, cultural and territorial unity that it was to keep until modern times, the Roman Empire never came back, as neither Byzantium nor the Islamic caliphates were able to reinstate comparable polities in western Eurasia. So, at least, some of those few who have peered out of regional histories have remarked. 5 One of them, Walter Scheidel, has called this phenomenon the ›First Great Divergence‹, as opposed to the Great Divergence that Kenneth Pomeranz has set in modern times. 6 According to Scheidel, this early parting of the ways between China and the West projected long shadows on their respective futures:
…the cyclical restoration of a China-wide empire in the East and the decline of empire and central government in the West, followed by the slow creation of a polycentric state system that proved resistant to any attempts to impose hegemony.
Entering modernity as a dynamic political pluriverse would have given Europe a fateful edge over its once-thriving East Asian counterpart. The rest is well known.
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Let me hasten to point out that I find this narrative none too convincing. One reason is that the imperial comeback at the end of the sixth century may have been far less of the water shed these scholars imagine, as the dynastic polities that made it were considerably more precarious than they admit. The Tang in particular, after a glorious ride of a hundred years, from the mid-eighth century could only cast a ritual authority over a largely fragmented territory that in 907 would shed even this fiction of unity. One should wait at least until the advent and consolidation of the Song 宋 from the end of the tenth century for the im perial cycle in China to acquire its unique endurance, but that would have been an altogether different world. 8 Yet, a divergence there was, and after so much history in parallel one should be no less than intrigued at how it came about. What I would like to start assessing here is how the tugs of war, at times very warlike indeed, between newly emerging monastic bodies and political elites shaped the respective destinies of the Buddhist community and the im perial entity in China, before and until the latter seemingly found its alchemy for self-perpetuation, at the end of the first millennium of the Common Era.
5 See, for example, Adshead, China in World History, 55, and Lewis, China between Empires, 54. 6 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, influentially arguing that China and Europe shared a not too dissimilar path of development up to the Industrial Revolution. For a valuable long-term view of this question see now Davids, Religion, which focuses on the different role of religious institutions in the formation of human capital and the circulation of useful knowledge in China and Europe between 700 and 1800.
many who were just not monks. 13 Several decades later, in 404, a Southern lord has similar remarks: »evaders of labour service (biyi 避役) gather in a hundred hamlets, fugitives make crowds in monasteries and temples.« 14 Again in the south, in 458, a ruler complains that the community of monks had turned into a »harbour for fugitives« (busou 逋藪). 15 Some scholars have seen in these scattered records early indications of fiscal exemption for the monastic community. 16 However, things are less straightforward and arguably more interesting. What we have here are in fact repeated references to fugitives, criminals, and people shirking corvée duties found in large numbers in Buddhist temples and among the monks. Nothing is said about any avoidance of or exemption from taxes in general. Labour service (yi 役) was a fiscal obligation of sorts for adult male peasants, who could be called on limited shifts of up to one month per year, normally in their locality; its brunt, however, was chiefly borne by convicts and enslaved prisoners, who would serve considerably longer terms in the harshest conditions and anywhere the state authority commanded them. 17 The regular association in our early sources between fugitives and corvée absconders suggests that it was notably this group they had in view rather than the ordinary peasantry. Significantly, it does look as though Buddhist temples and monastic communities enjoyed some kind of extraterritoriality, since those evading arrest or labour conscription could find sanctuary in them. It remains to be seen whether such immunity attended to monastic status, or rather to the power of place. By the time of our records (fourth-fifth centuries) an organized saṃgha was no doubt emerging, but while nothing proves that Buddhist monks enjoyed special privileges, much would seem to suggest the opposite, as we shall see. Some of our earliest evidence of a Buddha-shrine concerns Zhai Rong 窄融, a warlord in the Jiangsu 江蘇 region at the end of the Han, who around AD 194 used his authority to erect a very large sacred compound of this sort, reportedly making room for more than 5,000 people (a figure that could double on festive occasions). In order to attract devotees to his Buddhist foundation and allow them to »receive the doctrine« (shou dao 受道), Zhai 13 Gaoseng zhuan (T vol. 50 no. 2059), 385b28-c4; cf. Wright, Fo-t'u-têng, 354-356 . All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Shi Hu (r. 334-349) was a sovereign of the north in the short-lived Later Zhao 趙 dynasty; his request sparked the earliest official remonstrances against Buddhism on record in China.
14 Hongming ji (T vol. 52 Rong would exempt the local population from other corvée duties (fu qi ta yi 復其他役).
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In this case at least, we can be sure that those granted exemption from labour service were not monks, but laypeople from surrounding areas, and in droves. 19 Although such a privilege appears to have ensued from the ad hoc initiative of a local leader, it stands to reason that a Buddha-shrine with its vast compound would be seen as justifying that privilege on sacred grounds. Indeed, one further document from the same third-century source points rather neatly in this direction. In a report on the kingdom of Han 韓 in the Korean peninsula, we read of shamanic precincts called sodo (Ch. sutu 蘇塗), large enough to be deemed as »sepa-rate districts« (bie yi 別邑), where heavenly spirits were worshipped around a sacred pole at the centre. The Chinese historian notes, »if fugitives get inside them, they (i.e. the masters of the sodo) never hand them over, as they are fond of those who practise banditry«; next he adds that »the principle on which the sodos are established is similar to the buddhas, but their religious practice is different.« 20 In other words, the sodos of Korea were sacred areas where criminals and fugitives could take sanctuary, and to the author of our source they immediately called to mind the Buddha-shrines in China. It does seem, then, that from a very early date Buddhist compounds enjoyed some form of asylum privilege, which evidently extended to their visitors and residents, but was not inherent to any religious personhood of the latter. At the end of the third century, when these notes were written, there were just over 3,700 monks and nuns and 180 Buddhist temples in all of China according to one count. 21 The former figure was probably only a rough estimate, since no monastic registration is attested at this time, and if it referred, as it seems reasonable, to the garbed and shaven-headed ones that one would outwardly recognize as religious professionals (whatever their actual status), more substantial numbers must have been around the Buddha-shrines. Still, the size of the Buddhist clergy in this long period must have been overall inconsiderable, its very existence as a religious order ill-defined, its exemptions accordingly unobtrusive -until all this started to change.
21 Bianzheng lun (T vol. 52 no. 2110), 502c18-19. Unlike Gernet (Buddhism in Chinese Society, 6), I understand the mention of the »two capitals« (er jing 二京) in this passage as referring to what precedes rather than what follows, which means that the numbers of monks and temples are national totals (as demanded by the context) rather than for the two main cities only. The Bianzheng lun is a seventh-century work of Buddhist apologetics, and some of its information should be taken with a pinch of salt; however, there is nothing inherently implausible in its historical statistics on the size of the Buddhist community from the Western Jin (266-316) to the Sui (581-618). It should be noticed that from 280 and until their demise, the Western Jin had been able to unify Chinese territory, if only for three decades and before a more decisive breakup; hence the Bianzheng lun totals are likely to refer to both north and south. Under these circumstances, the monastic community in the north kept on swelling, and by the end of the Wei dynasty, in the 530s, its statistics were staggering: 47 large state monasteries, 839 monasteries owned by aristocratic families, 30,000 temples across the realm, and an astonishing two million monks and nuns, although the last figure is expressly presented in one source as an estimate, taking into account large numbers of commoners who had joined the clergy to escape fiscal obligations. 36 This brings us back to our initial question. One should also bear in mind that the vinaya does not appear to condone tax evasion -which is equated to theft and thus classed as a pārājika, a major offence demanding expulsion from the order -although most monastic codes only envisage custom duties for itinerant monks, whilst offering no legislation on issues of poll or land tax. 39 to pay taxes (比丘無輸稅法), and they only sin if, with a thieving intent, they help laypeople to evade customs. 42 All these rules in which errant monks serve as accessories to tax-evading merchants were probably devised in an Indian society where taxation of trade factored prominently into fiscal revenues; against the agrarian backdrop of their Chinese translations, they would hardly have come across with the force of a ›render unto Caesar‹, though neither would they give much ammunition to a case for exemption. The normative position of the clergy, again as expressed in its disciplinary codes, seems to have been a guarded expectation to be left alone by the state on account of its ascetic withdrawal from worldly business, albeit with a number of very telling provisos. Surviving vinayas from a number of different schools include a section detailing the conditions restraining admission into the monastic order. [91] [92] . Note that while the article and its etiological narrative refer to a soldier, the Pali and Sanskrit term for the latter, rājabhaṭa, literally means ›a king's servant‹, and is accordingly understood in the Chinese translations as ›an official‹ (guanren 官人). The exception is the vinaya of the Mahāsāṃghikas, where a literal rendition of rājabhaṭa as wangchen 王 臣, ›a king's servant‹, could be construed as referring specifically to officials but also to any subject serving the ruler. The extensive implications of this wording are here balanced by an interesting casuistry (ibid.), in which the Buddha distinguishes four types of such subjects: those with rank and salary, those with rank but no salary, those with salary but no rank, those with neither rank nor salary. He explains that the first two categories are not allowed to become monks either »in this kingdom« or in other kingdoms. Those with salary but no rank are not allowed into the order ›in this kingdom‹, but they may in other kingdoms. Those with neither rank nor salary are admitted as monks in every kingdom. This formulation would arguably make room for the acceptance into the clergy of virtually everyone in the king's service (thus including conscripts and corvée labourers), with the sole exception of rank-and salary-holders. significant that in some though not all of the vinayas, the relevant rules, which the Buddha establishes so as not to irk those in power and thus safeguard the integrity of the saṃgha, are often presented as exceptions to a generic immunity granted by the king to all monks and nuns: »There is nothing to do against those who go forth among the recluses, sons of the Sakyans.‹ 48 However, it is not difficult to see that anyone owing taxes and corvées to the state would easily fall within one or the other of the categories above, so that the monastic community would have had to tread on eggshells only to abide by its own standards. This is most paradoxically reflected in what must be an interpolation -and all the more interesting for us because it is an interpolation -in the discipline of the Dharmaguptakas. This vinaya is unique in that it expressly includes among those barred from ordination »someone having [their] name [in the state] registers, or someone evading state taxation« (或有名籍, 或避官租 賦). 49 The context in which this passage occurs suggests that it was inserted directly into the Chinese text, although it is difficult to determine whether this happened at the time of its initial translation in 412 or later, possibly under the Tang, when the Dharmaguptaka-vinaya rose to normative prominence in China. 50 Whoever tampered with it and made up this rule must have faced the situation it claims to counter; but if our interpolation does seem to confirm from the inside a recurrent outsider accusation that people would join the Buddhist clergy only to shelter themselves from taxation, it does not thereby also prove the existence of a legal exemption in the background. In fact, it rather contradicts it: for if monks were not to pay taxes, why would anyone not paying taxes be denied ordination as a monk? 51 This apparent non sequitur can be accounted for in different ways. The authors of the rule, for example, may have lived in a society where taxation only hit certain sectors of the population, or at least so they wished. Elites extracting revenue chiefly from trade or from routine plunder may well have allowed that, after all, and it may be no coincidence that the one regime granting tax immunity to all clergies were the Mongols. 52 Alternatively, the rule may have countenanced a scenario where one would seek monastic ordination before becoming a taxpayer, or after ceasing to be one. None of this makes much sense in China, however, and the likelihood is that the clause barring tax-evaders from admission into the saṃgha simply gave a perfunctory cue of disapproval to a state of things that, however widespread and indeed unavoidable, would lack any official sanction. Whether such a rule could ever be applied in practice was in fact entirely contingent upon the absence of a universal system of taxation, or of the state's ability to enforce it: this is a crucial issue to which I return below. A similar quandary would engulf any attempt to observe the prohibition, in this case attested in all the vinayas, for soldiers to become Buddhist monks: it could probably work in a state with an elite mercenary army, much less in one recruiting its military through conscription or large-scale enlistment, such as the territorial soldiery established at the end of the Northern dynasties and in the early Tang.
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May I repeat myself at this point: let's not take any exemption for granted. The disciplinary codes translated in the fifth century, on the eve of the first major confrontation between Buddhism and the state in China, would set a normative template for a regular clergy whose existence was still largely theoretical. But if these very codes could not spell out a clear stance on fiscal and penal immunity, why should we expect the ruling elites to have warranted what the monastic elites were unable to ask?
Scattered evidence from the period of disunion should accordingly be read afresh, and without prejudice. In the south we should note a document by Xun Ji 荀濟 (d. 547), a vehement critic of the pro-Buddhist policies of emperor Wu 武 of the Liang 梁 (r. 502-549). Xun notes that »monks come from the poor, and they scheme to avoid taxes and corvées« (僧出寒微, 規免租役).
54 His wording suggests that, while monastic status may have offered loopholes to evade fiscal duties, it granted no legal exemption as such. 55 In the north, an apocryphal Chinese sūtra probably dating from the early sixth century voices the distress of its surely monastic author at the vexing levies that state authorities were forcing on the 52 The Mongols, of course, did not lack their own taxation systems and, in time, tended to adopt many of those of the sedentary peoples they had conquered, including the Chinese. However, they relied on requisitions and extraordinary levies far more than they were able to develop forms of regular tribute. Compare Schurmann, Mongolian tributary practices, and Smith, Mongol and Nomadic Taxation, two classic studies respectively stressing the former and the latter aspect. 55 Kenneth Ch'en translates the key phrase guimian zuyi 規免租役 as »according to the law, they are exempt from taxation« (Anti-Buddhist Propaganda, 189). This is wrong: the term gui 規 can also mean a ›rule‹, although it would be unusual for state regulations, but in the present passage it must have the alternative meaning ›to scheme‹; in fact, the compound guimian 規免 is well attested in medieval Chinese in the sense of ›finding ways to avoid [something unwanted]‹, see Luo, Hanyu da cidian, vol. 10, 324 . Cf. a nearly identical phrase within a passage in the Sui shu (24.681), describing a situation of widespread tax evasion in the Shandong area in the early years of the Sui dynasty (the 580s): »Out of every ten people, the layabouts dodging corvée duties were six or seven. There were slackers everywhere, some pretending to be old and some young, scheming so as not to pay taxes« 避役惰遊者十 六七。四方疲人, 或詐老詐小, 規免租賦. Briefly, and it is no minor difference, what Xun Ji complains about is monastic tax evasion, not tax exemption. Wei complains that, after the introduction of monastic registration, people had been trying to take advantage of it as they would »falsely claim to have entered the path in order to avoid paying taxes« (假稱入道以避輸課). 57 A similar grievance will be raised several decades later: in the Wei shu 魏書 (ca. 554), the historian remarks that after the Zhengguang 正光 era (520-525), as the state authorities were increasingly imposing conscription to face a general crisis, »locally registered people would associate with those who have entered the path on the pretence that they revere the śramaṇas, but in fact to avoid taxes and corvées« (所在編民, 相 與入道, 假慕沙門, 實避調役). 58 These documents stop short of admitting unambiguously that monks were exempt, but they do reinforce a view of the monastery as a tax haven of choice for fiscally battered populations. The big claim finally comes in 570 and again in the north, just before the second great proscription of Buddhism, although the source is not entirely unbiased: a lay apologist for the saṃgha brags that Buddhist monks, unlike Taoist priests, do not serve as soldiers or pay in-kind taxes (zu 租), and enjoy such exemptions because they are ultimately of royal stock. 59 Yet, a nearly contemporary document puts this boast in context. In 567, at the same northern court, the maverick monk Wei Yuansong 衛元嵩 (d.u.) had plead ed for sweeping religious reformation, denouncing the corruption of the clergy. One of his proposals was that unseemly rich monks be made to pay an exemption tax: »if wealthy monks pay a tax to be exempted from fiscal liability (ding 丁), then all monks will certainly disdain ceasing to pay taxes, and will strive to check stinginess and greed« 富僧輸課免丁, 則 諸僧必望停課, 爭斷慳貪. 60 Wei's request conveys that while the monastic elite indeed enjoyed fiscal privileges, avoiding taxation was more of an endeavour for the larger mass of the saṃgha, which could be put off it as long as an example was set with their most powerful members.
The foregoing evidence is doubtless contradictory, and inconclusive at best: only a very selective reading of the sources can warrant the conclusion, currently held by several Chinese scholars, that tax immunity was the rule for Buddhist monks during the period of division. 61 Moroto Tatsuo 諸戸 立雄, who has studied the issue of monastic taxation in medieval China in some detail, acknowledges that things are none too clear before the Tang: monks were not on ordinary household registers, but if they were probably excluded from individual imposition (most certainly from corvée labour), their estates may have been taxed nevertheless, something which becomes more certain after the fiscal reforms of the late eighth century. 62 Nor can such a clear-cut line be drawn at this stage between the regular saṃgha and the registered population, for the latter, as we have seen, could suddenly swell the ranks of the former. Between the two worlds, especially in the north, there was in fact an extensive grey zone of rural monasticism, deeply rooted in the local society and often populated by hybrid figures of monastic householders and peasants, more similar to the married monks of Kroraina than to the role models in the vinayas and the urban clergy. 63 Tackling this phenomenon, which had no clear equivalent in the south, was thus tantamount to substantially extending the fiscal reach and economic basis of the state. 64 The northern regimes, as we are going to see, would rise to this challenge with remarkable success, rewriting the rules of the imperial game in the process.
The fall and fall of the tributary state
Two preliminary conclusions can probably be drawn from our discussion so far. The first is that forms of exemption for the Buddhist clergy did exist in China during the period of division, but rather de facto than de jure. Evidence of taxation is consistent with this scenario and should not be construed as an exception to a rule: there was no rule. The second point is that whatever privilege there was, it appears to have descended, initially at least, less from the dubious charisma of the monks than from the sacred aura of the Buddha-shrines; communities established within the hallowed precincts of the buddhas would apparently acquire some of their immunities, and this would also explain why, for a long time, those escaping jail or conscription would flock to them.
To discern a meaningful image in this hazy picture, however, we may need to stand back and consider the broader setting. The word ›exemption‹, in particular, should be used with some caution, for as soon as we use it to refer to the state's withdrawal from demands imposed on some of its subjects, we are already assuming an absolute power of that state to im-pose and exact those demands. This may well be what a state is about, monopoly of violence and all, but if so, here is another word that invites prudence. For in Late Antique China at least, the various ›states‹ that contested its territory simply did not have that power.
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A degree of functional weakness, especially in fiscal matters, had been connatural with the Chinese imperial formation almost from the outset. The Han dynasty had survived for centuries on a regime of low land tax, not out of frugality, but to avoid both the empowerment of collectors in the provinces and a fiscal overload that would have quickly eroded the tax base. The bulk of the peasantry who were not landowners were in any case already ground down under the heavy rents owed to their landlords, which included the court itself.
66 There was also a poll tax cashed from across the empire, but the government chiefly relied on its own demesnes and on tributary resources from the region around the capital rather than from the broader territory; provisioning that area was therefore key to maintaining the sway of the imperial centre over the periphery. 67 Taking these and other aspects into account, Andrew
Eisenberg has described the premodern Chinese polity in Weberian terms as a patrimonial regime in which a single extended household ruling from a royal court exerted varying degrees of military and fiscal coercion over semi-autonomous local elites acknowledging its suzerainty. 68 In Eisenberg's effective characterization, the fulcrum of this deliberately inefficient power structure »was essentially a regionally based garrison regime with tentative ties to its provinces«.
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However, the inherent, long-term limitations of the imperial formation in China should not obscure the epic dimensions of its collapse in the Late Antique transition. Demographic data are a sobering token of this shift. In the second century AD, the Han empire, Rome's twin in eastern Eurasia, ran several censuses giving returns between 9.2 and 10.8 million households with 47.6 to 56.5 million individuals. 70 One century later, however, the three kingdoms that took its place could only count 1,473,433 households and 7,672,881 individuals altogether. 71 Comparably low population figures are randomly recorded throughout the age of division, especially in the south. 72 What happened? Since neither bubonic plagues 65 A significant strand of contemporary political theory is indeed unwilling to consider premodern empires as ›states‹ at all, reserving the term instead for the polities defined by sovereignty and mutually exclusive territoriality that emerged in Europe from the end of the Middle Ages (and to those later following their model): see, for example, Kratochwil, Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality; Spruyt, Sovereign State and Its Competitors. This view clearly has merit, not least here because it bears on the problematic historical relationship between modern China and its imperial predecessors. Many of its assumptions, however, sit rather uncomfortably with evidence from outside premodern Europe, something which would warrant fuller discussion elsewhere. In the present context I will keep to a minimal definition of ›state‹ as any political organization making absolute claims over territory and people, with further qualifications in the discussion below.
66 The land tax amounted to a paltry thirtieth of the crop through most of the Han dynasty, but rents varied between a half and two thirds, depending on whether peasants had to borrow oxen, seeds, and implements from their landlords. See Crowell, Government Land Policies, [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [105] [106] [107] [108] [109] [110] [111] [112] [113] Here again Chinese history appears to run on a parallel track to the Western end of the Old World, for there too one observes a similar waning of the fiscal reach of the state in the collapsing Roman empire, followed by the advent of smaller polities under Romano-Germanic rulers that were unable or unwilling to enforce taxation, and relied instead on the lands they could directly control. Chris Wickham has explained this transition in Marxian terms as one involving two competing modes of production: a tributary mode, in which a strong state drawing resources from taxation could enjoy a large degree of autonomy from and power over local elites, and a feudal mode where a weak state was instead beholden to rent-taking aristocracies. Both modes could coexist within the same polities, but while the tributary state seemingly managed to survive and endure in China and other premodern Asian empires, it vanished in the West, where land and rent defined the early Middle Ages.
75 Walter Scheidel has then built on Wickham's metanarrative to refine his thesis of a ›First Great Divergence‹, presenting the return of a unified empire in China at the end of the sixth century as a resurgence of the ›strong tributary state‹, heralded by a significant rise of population counts in the north after the demographic eclipse of the post-Han period.
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Seductively elegant though they are, these models fit China's Late Antiquity only imperfectly. We should note in the first place that low census figures do not necessarily imply a demise of the state, nor rising demographic tallies its strengthening. In the third century, for example, the two regional kingdoms of Shu Han 蜀漢 (221-263) in the west and Wu 吳 (222-280) in the south were able to maintain impressive bureaucracies against dramatically 73 I have left this cheeky remark from the conference paper, but in the meantime Morelli et al., Yersinia pestis, came to my notice. Their discovery, based on cutting-edge genome sequencing techniques, that the bacterial agent of plague probably »evolved in or near China« more than 2,600 years ago casts a sinister light on repeated but vague reports of epidemics in Chinese historical sources. Cf., however, the different responses of plague historians to their conclusions in Little, Plague Historians in Lab Coats, and Benedictow, Yersinia pestis. At present, the earliest certain instance of the bubonic plague (now also confirmed through historical DNA testing) remains the Justinianic Pandemic that spread in the Eastern Mediterranean and its inlands from the sixth century AD, whereas Chinese literary evidence does not suggest any comparable episode for scale and symptoms before this outbreak. This is not to deny the probable role of epidemics in Chinese demographic trends, as I hint below. Tellingly, both Shu Han and Wu were eventually overwhelmed by a northern regime whose own crippled demographics did not prevent it from deploying large armies and achiev ing a short-lived reunification of China. Since the 190s, the Cao 曹 clan, which would soon rule the north in its own right as the Wei 魏 dynasty (220-266), had effectively addressed the fiscal problem by means of state-owned agricultural colonies (tuntian 屯田) manned by conscripted civilians. These were removed from the authority of the Board of Revenue and accordingly exempted from taxes and corvées, but had to pay a rent of 50-60% of their yield to the government. 79 The farmers in the colonies were seemingly hidden from censuses, and in 263 the Cao Wei state could only count 663,423 households and 4,432,881 individuals, a dismal percentage of the north China population under the Eastern Han. 80 The system nonetheless produced enough resources to give the northern kingdom, which would switch to the Jin 晉 dynasty in 266, a decisive edge over its two rivals. 81 One of the first acts of the Jin government was to dismantle the special administration of the colonies, and of the colonies 77 In 263, when Shu Han was defeated and annexed by the Cao Wei 曹魏 kingdom (then ruling in the north), it reported a population of 280,000 households and 940,000 individuals, with 40,000 government employees (li 吏), thus one every 7 households/23.5 individuals. When it was Wu's turn to be conquered by the north in 280, it counted 523,000 households, 2,300,000 individuals, and 32,000 clerks, one every 16.3 households/71.9 individuals. See respectively Sanguo zhi, 33.900 (comm.) and 48.1177 (comm.). These ratios of administrators against population should be compared to the data for the whole Han empire around the time of its demographic peak in AD 2 (12,233,062 households, 59,594,978 individuals, see Han shu, 28B.1640); a few years earlier, in 5 BC, there is an overall count of 130,285 government employees (see Bielenstein, Bureaucracy of Han Times, 156, 205 n. 1), which means a considerably lower ratio of one every 93.9 households/457.4 individuals. Thus the ›weak states‹ that succeeded the Han could actually deploy many more clerks as a proportion of the registered population than their ›strong‹ predecessor.
78 Recent archaeological evidence from Zoumalou 走馬樓 at Changsha 長沙, Hunan has offered a snapshot of heavy taxation and tight governmental control of the population in a single district in the southern kingdom of Wu during the period AD 232-238 (for a good overview, see Lu, Managing Locality). This cannot have been the norm across the entire territory, as it does not fit the bigger picture of the period. Describing the situation in the Northeast a few decades earlier, a contemporary observer also notes that the few left on the household registers were made to pay considerably more tax than was their due: see the quotation from Sima Biao's 司馬彪 (240-306) Jiuzhou chunqiu 九州春秋 at Sanguo zhi, 6.195 (commentary) . This overview warrants some adjustment to the Wickham/Scheidel model. A ›strong state‹, with enough resources and soldiers to successfully entertain imperial ambitions, could subsist as a militarized rent-taking landlord, whilst relinquishing much of its tributary prerogatives and census scope. Less successfully, it could still linger on in patches, with its bureaucracies ganging up on the easier bits of the tax base. Conversely, the rapid expansion of population registration that ushered in the Jin reunification in the second half of the third century did not result in a stable tributary empire. I shall briefly explore below some of the reasons behind this failure, but two quick observations are in order. One is that ever since the long decline of the Han dynasty, no fiscal leviathan was in place to restrain the emergence of social and political actors that could compete with the patrimonial centre, or simply ignore its demands. More importantly, however, even in the glory days of the tributary empire, taxation may have been less about the extraction of revenue than it was about the assertion of territorial suzerainty, a ritual measure of the extent to which the centre could command compliance from the periphery: through periodical intimidation no doubt, but also through the exercise of an imperial authority that would encompass what we parse as the economic, political, and religious spheres -what I call the metapolitical order. 85 It is this order that collapsed in the Late Antique transition; it is its reconstitution that local elites and Buddhist communities would challenge from different perspectives. 82 The separate administration for the agricultural colonies was abolished first in 264, at the very end of the Cao Wei, when the government was already firmly in the hands of the Sima 司馬 clan that would soon establish the Jin dynasty; it was then confirmed in 266 in the name of the new regime. See Sanguo zhi, 4.153 and Jin shu, 3.55. For the conclusion that the colonies survived the change of jurisdiction until around 280, I rely on the analysis in Crowell, Government Land Policies, 167-168, 183-187.
83 We go from 663,423 households for the Cao Wei only in 263 to 3,770,000 households for the unified empire in 282 (see Sanguo zhi, 22.636, comm.). If we deduct from the latter figure the 280,000 households added from Shu Han in 263 and the 523,000 households from Wu in 280 (above, note 77), we have a spectacular increase of 2,303,577 households over this short period. Tang Changru (Clients and Bound Retainers, 117-118) also notes this demographic expansion, although with more conservative figures based on a Jin census in 280, and links it to scattered evidence of stricter controls on registration evasion in northern China at the time. However, a simpler explanation is that the increase came from the registration of households previously under the separate administration for agricultural colonies.
84 See Yang, Notes on the Economic History, 166-169 (translating a traditional account) and the focused discussion in Crowell, Government Land Policies, 85 This suggestion will probably be anathema to Wickham's analysis, although it is not necessarily in contrast with it to assume, as I do, that the tributary reach was an expression of imperial suzerain power rather than its basis. The former, emboldened by the implosion of the centre, would progressively gain confidence in advancing an alternative view of society, where status no longer descended from service to the state -at least not only or even chiefly -but from birth into a local community with its hierarchies, and clientship into one replaced allegiance to the other. 86 Forms of manorialism, in which helpless peasantries running away from a crumbling administration would cluster around the fortress of some provincial magnate, had been spreading ever since the troubles at the end of the Han. However, it was especially from the early fourth century, after the Jin lost control of the north under nomadic pressure, that the territorial power of the great local clans became entrenched. Strong enough to shield themselves and their large numbers of retainer households from the fiscal demands of the state, they effectively stalled any attempt at a recovery of the tributary empire. 87 In the south, the trend would prove irreversible, as the increasingly short-lived dynasties ruling from Jiankang 建康 -hobbled between the centrifugal agency of the aristocracy and waves of northern émigrés that persistently shirked registration -could never reach an effective control of their populations.
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Buddhism in the fiscal resurgence of the northern regimes
The great clans that remained in the north China plain after it fell to Central and Inner Asian tribes soon negotiated similar privileges with the new rulers, who were more than willing to use their services to squeeze surplus from the peasantry. not mention is that at this stage, fearsome and ruthless though they doubtlessly were, these Xianbei lords of the north were still clumsy greenhorns in the complexities of a bureaucratic state -bulls in a China shop, as it were. Semi-permanent warfare and booty distribution were the main glues sticking their fractious elite together, but the very consolidation of conquest set a timer on this expedient for stability. 94 They also lacked a professional administration, as their officials did not receive salaries, but were allowed to grab what they could from their bailiwicks. 95 Such a system evidently could not be either popular or efficient: frequent tax holidays granted in the early reigns of the dynasty surely were not acts of generosity, but acknowledgments of the difficulties of regular collection and the necessity to mollify an exasperated populace. 96 To control the local communities, the government had to rely on the heads of the great clans, who, exactly like their far more powerful counterparts in the south, could thus hide large numbers of dependent households.
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Yet, it was this very same improbable regime, on the mere survival of which any wager would have seemed foolhardy after so many nomadic meteors had flickered out of the north China sky, that in the latter half of the fifth century contrived to reinvent itself as the strongest tributary state since the Han, and lay the foundations for the return of a unified empire one century later. Under Emperor Xiaowen 孝文帝 (r. 471-499), a sweeping series of measures dramatically enhanced the fiscal and political authority of the Northern Wei central government and its ability to lead an agrarian society. From 473 inspectors were sent across provinces and districts to enforce household registration and ferret out hidden dependents and absconders. 98 In 484 fixed salaries funded by tax income at last were introduced for state that would shape the agrarian state for the next three centuries to come. 100 To support its implementation and stamp out registration fraud, critical synergies were established with the local communities. 101 Some of these measures, notably the ›Equal Field‹, were expressly meant to promote agriculture through the maximization of land cultivation, and curb the engrossment of arable land at the hands of the powerful clans. While the latter objective is unlikely to have been fully achieved or even pursued, the reforms did assert the government's exclusive right over land and population across every inch of territory, and with it the idea that service to the state was the only legitimate source of economic status. 102 The suzerain ideal was back.
Once the new tributary foundations of the Northern Wei regime were in place, a spate of edicts in the 490s finally put some heavy Chinese make-up on its post-nomadic face, forcing Chinese customs and surnames on its elite, and moving the capital south from Pingcheng 平 城, at the edge of the steppe, to Luoyang 洛陽 in the Central Plain, where Han and Jin monarchs had once ruled over a unified empire.
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These developments are remarkable enough in themselves; seen against the trajectory of Buddhism in the same period, however, they present us with a gaping paradox, at least if we hold to the deep-seated view of monasticism as a major source of strain on the tributary state. 104 For we have seen that the second half of the fifth century was also when the Buddhist community and a monastic economy grew impetuously in northern China, with the proliferation of religious establishments that claimed immunities for their residents, on account of an altogether different brand of holiness from the one set in the imperial tradition: faced with a centrifugal force of this magnitude, with the great clans still riding roughshod over its fiscal demands and in the absence of an efficient bureaucracy, the Northern Wei state should rather have had a hard time staying afloat, never mind becoming so much stronger. But this is not what happened, and it bears wondering whether a very different dynamic, however counterintuitive, may have been at work in this transition. It is certain that, within a single generation, the Northern Wei rulers conceived and deployed the two fundamental attitudes the Chinese state would countenance in its confrontation with Buddhism during the following five hundred years: a frontal assault with spoliation versus tight regulation and control (stripping or strapping, one might say). The great persecution of 446 was virulent in its rhetoric and violent in its execution, but whatever else may 100 See Wei shu, 7A.156, with the full text of the edict at 110.2853-55. See also the memorial by Li Anshi 李安世 (d.u.) (Wei shu, 53.1176; tr. in Twitchett, Financial Administration, 210-211) , which is said to have inspired the policy. Under the new rules, male and female adults (married couples in later versions) replaced the household (hu 戶), by now a screen for hidden retainers, as the basic taxable unit; they received fixed amounts of land from the state, with an obligation to farm it and pay in-kind taxes on it until the end of their working lives, at which point they would return their allotments. The policy also established land allocations for official post-holders, to be returned at the end of tenure. The most comprehensive treatment of the ›Equal Field‹ system and its background is probably still Hori, Kindensei no kenkyū; see also Crowell, Government Land Policies, [305] [306] [307] [308] [309] [310] [311] [312] [313] [314] [315] [316] [317] . The overview in Twitchett, Financial Administration, 1-11, shows well the continuity of the system into the Tang period.
101 This was done in 486 by putting ›Three Chiefs‹ (sanzhang 三張) -chosen from local elders respectively at neighbourhood, hamlet, and ward level -in charge of supervising tax and corvée registration in collaboration with the state authorities. See Wei shu, 7B.161, 110.2855, and 42.954.
102 Cf. the observations in Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese Past, 48-50.
103 On these Sinicizing edicts see Lu, Cong Pingcheng dao Luoyang, , and the discussion in Holcombe, Xianbei in Chinese History, 24-28, noting the persistence of Xianbei traits in the ruling strata after the reforms.
have inspired it, it was launched after the last conquest in the north had stalled the Tuoba juggernaut and caused a dangerous lull in the previously regular distribution of booty. 105 If the great raid on the monasteries was really addressing a crisis in the traditional nomadic economy of predation, it must be significant that the main opponent of that raid and partisan of Buddhism in court circles, the Crown Prince Tuoba Huang 拓拔晃 (428-451), was also the one who, in those same years and circles, was championing a full-scale conversion to an agrarian economy, involving accurate land surveys and registration of the peasantry.
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These advocacies may or may not have been linked in the eyes of the young prince, but there is room to speculate that a growing segment of the Northern Wei elite would see Buddhism as an opportunity for a radical transformation of the state rather than an internal surrogate for the vanishing foe to plunder. In this respect, the imperfect synchronism between the controlled revival of Buddhism and the agrarian turn in the second half of the fifth century should give us pause for thought. It is not the case that an already well-oiled bureaucratic machine caught the monastic community in its cogs, as we might be tempted to assume with hindsight from later dynasties that yet built on the Northern Wei experience. It seems, instead, that the policies mandating the registration of the clergy and the creation of monastic administrators preceded the great wave of census control and the professionalization of the officialdom, or at best, they unfolded in parallel. 107 And it is, again, simply not true that a clear fiscal apparatus and policies were already in place that could define tax liabilities or exemptions for the Buddhist monks. It seems, instead, that ad hoc forms of land tenure for monasteries such as the buddha and saṃgha households were introduced before effective regulations on land and taxation were devised for the commoners.
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It almost looks as though the Tuoba government was testing its ability to count, tax, survey and control people and territory on the Buddhist clergy before tackling the big target. But surely there was more to it than that. In an age dominated by locality and birth in the definition of an individual's loyalties and obligations, and in which the idea of universal empire could no longer find a political referent, the Buddhist community was the only institution in the real world that had kept some essential traits of that idea -its translocal orien tation and its de-emphasis on birth -most visible. Buddhist establishments were literally everywhere, as once had been the relay stations for the Han imperial couriers and envoys, and kept in existence some form of the network of long-distance exchange that a large tributary state should have been able to offer. 110 Registering the clergy was evidently no minor exercise, as it involved having government eyes and hands in nearly every district and village, sifting through rural communities where the peasant and the monk often blurred into each other, but also poking around the great clans' turf. These checks should accordingly be seen as a major investment in population control and territorial suzerainty, especially if the state promoting them was one piously endorsing Buddhism, as the Northern Wei did from 453.
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Significantly, it is only after the ›Equal Field‹ policy was introduced -indeed, immediately after, in 486 -that we come across the first clear reference to people falsely claiming monastic status in order to avoid taxation.
112 This is presumably because, as Moroto has observed, the new regime linked fiscal duties to land allocation, and monks were not grantees under its terms, but were bound to a separate registration from ordinary householders.
the clergy. 115 These grievances appear to bear out our suspicion that the buddha and saṃgha households were in fact means for the state to extract revenue from the peasantry through the monasteries, even though the latter, at least their leaders, are likely to have received their cut and (mostly) lived happily with it. Another apocryphal text from the same background (though one that eventually made its way into the orthodox canon thanks to the ambiguities of its message) is the ›Scripture for Humane Kings‹ (Renwang jing 仁王經), which voices shrill frustration at the Northern Wei state control of the Buddhist community. The Buddha here blasts a latter age in which arrogant rulers install superintendents and registrars for the clergy, laypeople take the high seats in monasteries, and conscripts become bhikṣus; he warns that monks and nuns who are included in the registers and commanded by state authorities are not his disciples, for the law they obey is one for convicts and slaves. 116 These snippets do not really match the picture of a monastic community offering free rides to crowds of tax evaders, and basking in the glories and comforts of an imperial patronage so well attested in the records of Buddhism at the new capital Luoyang, or in the elite-sponsored programmes of Buddhist statuary and epigraphy at Yungang 雲崗 and Longmen 龍門. 117 It is a tale of two saṃghas, then, that runs through the revival of the tributary empire: one pampered, the other bullied, both finally hanging by a capricious thread spun in court politics. After fifty years from the reforms that had turned around its power structure, the Northern Wei state eventually collapsed under the weight of its internal contradictions, notably an unresolved conflict between the Sinicized and more conservatively Xianbei strands of its elite, and the growing restiveness of its military, once paramount but now largely sidelined. It was a revolt of garrisons that, between 524 and 534, dragged the dynasty to its doom and brought about its split into two halves under Sino-Xianbei warlord clans, the Yuwen 宇文 in Guanzhong and the Gao 高 in Henan and Shandong. These ruled at first through figureheads from the deposed dynasty, respectively as the Western Wei (535-557) and Eastern Wei (534-550), then in their own right as the Northern Zhou 周 (557-581) and the Northern Qi 齊 (550-577).
118 Both regimes resumed, tweaked and continued the land policies of the Northern Wei. 119 Their circumstances, however, were radically different, and a showdown was to be expected. The eastern state commanded far stronger agricultural resources, pop ulation, and tributary infrastructure; its ruling elite in the Central Plain also inherited the servile households previously attached to the Northern Wei court, but corruption and factional in stability, fuelled by ethnic tensions, were soon to squander much of its advantage. 120 The Yuwen regime in the west was an outlier: clinging to the less populated, poorer half of the former Tuoba empire, starved of revenue and manpower, it nonetheless rose to the challenge under the iron hand of its Xianbei military elite, and through reforms that gained momentum after the conquest of Sichuan from the south and a political revamping as the (Northern) Zhou dynasty in the 550s. 121 In both states the Buddhist presence was massive, but while the thriving economy of the east made room for control-cum-patronage and a functional accommodation between the elite and the clergy (much along the lines of the late Northern Wei), severe limitations on resources in the west meant that an appetite for spoliation was always lurking. 123 See Zhou shu, 5.85 for a summary of the proscription edict, which also targeted the Taoists (incomparably less numerous but ideologically influential). At the end of 577, addressing protests from a former monastic leader, Wudi would give a matter-of-fact justification for his decision: he had briefly studied Buddhism and found it to be of no benefit, hence he abolished it (決知非益, 所以除之); conversely, since the abolition the labour load on the population had been lighter, whereas fiscal revenue and troops had been steadily increasing, enabling him to subdue the Qi in the east and tribal rebels in the west, all of which was indeed beneficial (事有益). See Guang hongming ji (T vol. 52 no. 2103), 154b9-10, c18-20 . No trace here of the anti-Buddhist vitriol in the Northern Wei edicts during the first persecution: cf. Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, [65] [66] [67] the size of the Buddhist community in that rich and populous country. 126 An estimat ed three million monks, nuns, and their dependents were suddenly turned into soldiers and peasants; 40,000 monasteries with their lands, servants and gold changed hands overnight: from those emerging from a cloak to the long-nailed fists of the mandarins.
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The Northern Zhou were now sole lords of a territory larger than the Northern Wei at their heyday, since it included Sichuan and even regions south of the Yangzi; it was only a matter of time before they could close in on the last monarchic straw man in Jiankang. Wudi, however, did not live to see this day, as he died in his prime in 578 (retribution for his evil deeds, the Buddhists immediately ruled). The dynasty itself survived him by no more than three years, for in 581 one of Wudi's generals, Yang Jian 楊堅, born and grown in a Buddhist nunnery, seized power and established the last of the northern regimes, the Sui 隋 (581-618). Even before he formally ascended the throne, one of his first acts was to restore Buddhism; then, in 589, Sui troops finally stormed south virtually unopposed, and China was one empire again.
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Conclusion: Fearful symmetries, or the First Great Divergence postponed I have now reached the margins of my canvas without, I fear, anything resembling a complete picture. Yet, like a pointillist painter, I hope to have at least thrown around enough dots that may blend into a meaningful image in the beholder's eye. My core hypothesis, after all, is simple: the confrontation, from the fourth to the sixth centuries, between a rapidly growing saṃgha and the alien regimes that ruled northern China may have helped the latter to consolidate their state formation, and eventually acquire enough control of territory and resources to victoriously launch themselves into the imperial endgame, the conquest of the south and a durable unification of ›All under Heaven‹. In their unlikely attempt to cross over from predatory leagues of pastoralists to tributary empires, those regimes were soon caught in much the same quandary as their Chinese predecessors and competitors since the end of the Han: until they could bring the great local clans to heel, and enforce revenue collection across the length of their nominal realms, their claims to suzerain authority, however crowing, would sound persistently hollow. But as long as they failed to command ultimate suzerain authority, neither could these sedentarizing nomads dream of turning the skulking multitude of their subjects into obliging taxpayers. 129 The expansion of the Buddhist monastic body may have wedged into this vicious circle by offering an initial alternative for dispossessed peasants and social misfits, trapped between the rock of serfdom (thinly disguised as retainership into the great clans) and the hard place of imperial taxation. To the brawny rulers of the north, this must have looked at first as an irresistibly soft target to smash and grab, especially when the vital cycle of raiding and loot-sharing had reached a dead end. But you cannot empty the same coffer twice: in time, allowing the clergy to grow rich again, whilst keeping a close eye on the monks' names and numbers in official registers, must have seemed an altogether better option to expand the territorial and fiscal reach of the state, all the more so as it could soar on wings of genuine devotion from court to commoners. And while monks may have been officially denied taxpayer status in the ›Equal Field‹ system, it certainly would have been easier for the imperial bailiff to reclaim land and revenue from the monasteries, as soon as his lords would see fit, rather than thumping in frustration at the unyielding gates of the manors. Spoliation, for that matter, was always an option, and it was decisively taken in the 570s, as the Northern Zhou found through it the resources to defeat their archenemies in the northeast and ready themselves for the long-awaited conquest of the south. The return of imperial unity was finally achieved in 589, but at the hands of a successor regime, the Sui 隋, established by a Northern Zhou general and Buddhist sympathizer. The Sui showed all the traits of the ›strong tributary empire‹, able to enforce taxation and household registration across the entire extension of its territory, order great public works, and mobilize huge armies. A census in 609 returned 8,907,546 households and 46,019,956 individuals, the highest tally since the Eastern Han. 130 A tightly regulated Buddhist community meanwhile reached new heights under state patronage, and it must, again, be significant that one of its most fervent supporters was also remembered as the architect of the Sui fiscal renaissance.
131
As rulers of a unified empire, the Sui would last no more than three decades, but their inheritors, the Tang 唐 (618-907), would hold the scene for three centuries, and the new period of division that did follow their fall would quickly be ended by the advent of the Song in 960. It is this narrative that, as we have seen, has offered many scholars the glimpse of a China diverging from the West in Late Antiquity through the permanent recovery of an imperial statehood that the latter virtually lost forever. This would indeed be an apposite conclusion to these notes, if only I could endorse it. But I have suggested at the outset that even after the late sixth-century breakthrough, it would still take some time for ›China‹ to settle on its trademark cycle of long-term institutional stability; and while there is no space to consider the centuries up to the Song into any detail here, some final remarks may briefly broach prob lems that future research will hopefully address more thoroughly.
One of them is the lingering view of the Tang, a family name in world history books, as a single long and successful empire after the dark centuries of division, with the Sui as a mere prequel. Like so many other things about that dynasty, this view is a legacy of the Song period, but like so many others a distinctly questionable one. One should start observing, with the late Antonino Forte, that there were not one but two Tang dynasties: between the First Tang (618-690) and the Second Tang (705-907) there was in fact a different dynasty, the Zhou 周 (690-705). This was established by a remarkable woman, Wu Zhao 武曌, who ruled in her own right as empress -decisively buttressed by Buddhist support -after a much longer tenure of power from behind the scenes. 132 Apart from the political instability this fracture betrays, 133 our modern sensitivities (or presentist bias) should not distract us from the scandal that a female emperor meant to many of her contemporaries, and especially to those Song historians who successfully erased the memory of her dynasty. 134 Wu Zhao's case is there to suggest that in China, at the end of Late Antiquity, the imperial idea was a somewhat tentative business compared to the stiff template of later ages: how would we make room for the notion of a successfully reigning woman-pope in our historical view of the medieval papacy, for example? But the Tang were precarious in far more compartments, and probably more significant, including the all-important area of taxation and household registration. The Sui may well have revived the glories of the Han tributary state when they could count nine million households in 609. Two or three decades later, however, their successors could not reach three million, and as late as 652, at a time when political consolidation should have been by all means achieved, the tally was still well under four million. 135 It is entirely plausible that, at this stage, the Tang elite could manage perfectly well by alternative means, including the taxation of commerce and good old rent-taking from imperial estates. 136 If so, however, it also means that the suzerain power of the dynasty across its territory was limited, as there were arguably fewer places where the taxman could go and make claims on behalf of the govern ment. Only in the first half of the eighth century, notably during the long reign of Xuanzong 玄宗 (r. 712-756), would the registration capacity and demographic counts of the Tang reach back to the Sui records. But it would not last long: the rebellion of the Turco-Sogdian general An Lushan 安祿山 and his successors (755-763) shook the dynasty to the core, and left it limping ahead for the next one and a half centuries. 137 That household counts should have dropped spectacularly from nine million in 754 to 1.9 million in 760 is understandable, since at the latter date some of the most populous regions -Henan, Hebei, Shandong -were under the rebel dynasty of the Great Yan 燕 (756-763). 138 But even after the rebellion was quelled and a 132 Forte, Political Propaganda, Of course, any China historian knows this, and yet we keep on referring to a single Tang dynasty, whilst -incoherently -we distinguish between the Former/Western and the Later/Eastern Han, separated by Wang Mang's 王莽 Xin 新 dynasty interregnum (AD 9-23).
133 Geopolitical as well, since Wu Zhao's power base was in Luoyang, whereas Tang emperors mostly ruled from Chang'an (Guanzhong).
134 See Guisso, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 135 For the first figure, see Tongdian, 7.148; Cefu yuangui, 486:11b1; Xin Tang shu, 51.1344; for the second, see Tang huiyao, 84.1550 (3.8m), and Cefu yuangui, 486:11b9 (3.85m) . A lucid discussion of the demographic decline in the early Tang is in Pulleyblank, Registration of Population. Xiong (Emperor Yang, [193] [194] briefly notes this problem and is willing to explain it as a real depopulation following »unnatural causes such as war, famine, and corvée [sic]«, but I cannot follow him on this point: apart from the lack of evidence for a loss of life on such a huge scale, it seems difficult to explain how the population could nearly double in the next five decades, as we are going to see.
136 Cf. Pulleyblank, Registration of Population, [293] [294] [295] and Twitchett, Financial Administration, [9] [10] [11] On the An Lushan rebellion and its long-term repercussions see, among others, Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, and Pulleyblank, sweeping fiscal reform was introduced in 780, the Tang state never recovered its full registration capacity, as tallies varied between 2.4 million households in 807 to 4.9 million in 845.
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I have argued above that census records should not be used uncritically as a gauge of power, for the latter comes in different kinds that may or may not converge to shape an imperial formation: a strong state could dispense to significant degrees with the very exercise of taxation and household registration, thanks to direct landownership or extraordinary levies and requisitions (the Cao and Yuwen regimes in the third and sixth centuries), although this type regularly proved unable to produce enduring suzerainty over large territories; or it could survive by relying on unfortunate tributary pockets, presumably cross-subsidizing a larger apparatus of power (Shu Han, Wu), though in this case too not for long; or it could maximize its territory and indeed expand its registration reach, but not enough to secure a durable base of suzerain power for the centre over the periphery (as was the case of the Jin in the 280s). The long-lasting Tang, it would seem, managed to survive by switching across these different options, but we should resist viewing them as a strong tributary empire through out, as they only looked like one during portions of their cycle.
Against this background, we must observe that the confrontation between Buddhism and the state continued across this period and until the latter half of the tenth century, climaxing in two more major persecutions: in 845 under the Tang emperor Wuzong 武宗 (r. 840-846), and in 955 under the short-lived regime of the Later Zhou 周 (951-960), which ruled over northern China in the period of fragmentation known as the Five Dynasties (907-960), and would successfully morph into no less than the great Song at its end.
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At a closer look, there is a fearful symmetry between these two incidents and the first two proscriptions in the fifth and sixth centuries. In both cases, we have a violent and ideologically loaded persecution (446, 845), followed after about one century by a less venomous, economically driven suppression of the Buddhist community (574/7, 955). It is also noteworthy that, in the latter pair, both proscriptions of 574/7 and of 955 were launched by regional states in the north on the eve of decisive campaigns that would lead to the reunification of Chinese territory, respectively under the Sui and the Song, and, arguably, provided through confiscation an essential quota of the resources for those ventures.
However, there were no more large-scale proscriptions of Buddhism after the tenth century, as the ostensibly capricious oscillation between exemption and disenfranchisement, patronage and suppression was to find its long-term balance in a state grip on the clergy that would never slacken after the advent of the Song. 141 The end of the confrontation with Buddhism that had started under the Northern Wei, and whose fundamental terms had been defined back then, would thus give way to the consolidation of the unified bureaucratic empire as the enduring form of the Chinese polity until modernity: if nothing else, surely this is a ›great coincidence‹. 142 Whether it also marked a fundamental divergence from the historical trajectory of the West is something that comparative historians may want to explore in greater depth from this particular entry point, but some preliminary counterfactual observations do seem relevant. That is, we have a very significant similarity between Eastern and Western Eurasia in Late Antiquity -as already noted, the fall of large tributary empires on both sides, followed by social, economic, and political fragmentation and the parallel rise of large religious bodies wedging their way into a collapsing metapolitical order. But while this rise had been firmly harnessed in China by the end of the first millennium, this would not be the case in the West: as a result, Song China and its successors would not be faced with the ›highly organized religious community‹ of Latin Christendom, or a ›Papal Revolution‹, or a gigantic ›proprietary church‹ standing in the way of their imperial statehood.
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One would not leave this chain of adventurous remarks without sounding some ringing note of caution. More research is doubtlessly needed, including robust scrutiny of quantitative data and minute explorations of the historical contexts. And yet, haven't we already start ed to question the cliché of an eternal China, fated to stay imperial and one since antiquity? Perhaps no one put this view more forcefully than A. C. Graham, a master Sinologist like few, who once quipped that »[a]bout the time when the First Emperor was looking for the elixir of life China discovered the secret of the immortal empire, the unkillable social organism.« 144 The China we have known tells a different story, one where empire doth perish in the maelstrom of Late Antiquity, and bantam lords dance clumsily on its carcass, for centuries. Until along come monks and nomads, and look what happens!
